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ABSTRACT: Through a number of isolated initiatives that began in the 1960s, Brazil accumulated 
knowledge and experience that in the late 1990s culminated in the implementation of the first 
nationwide public health action meant to coordinate health bodies and personnel from the 
federal, state, and municipal administrative levels to address a chronic degenerative disease. 
The main goal of this article is to analyze the process of construction of this public policy for 
cancer control in Brazil —more specifically, organized screening for the control of cervical 
cancer in the form of the Viva Mulher program. Our analytical approach relies on elements 
from the history of public policy and from the history of institutions, combining the use of 
documental sources, scientific literature, and interviews with managers involved in the process 
under study. Our analysis endeavors to show how and to what extent this national process 
incorporated the experiences of local projects and responded both to pressure from the social 
movement and to the country’s political environment. It further shows how the new context, 
shaped by changes in the organization of the Brazilian health system, influenced this process.
KEY WORDS: Cervical cancer, cancer control, history of cancer control in Brazil, history of 
disease, history of public policy.
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1. Introduction 
According to the José Alencar Gomes da Silva National Cancer Institute 1 
commonly known by its acronym, INCA, cervical cancer is the second 
most prevalent form of cancer among women in Brazil, associated with 
the deaths of some 4,986 women in 2010 and responsible for 17,540 new 
cases in 2012 2. Estimates suggest that the Pap testing of asymptomatic 
women between the ages of 25 and 64, followed by treatment of detected 
lesions, could reduce the mortality rate by around 80%. This would require a 
population screening program and guaranteed follow-up of cases presenting 
any level of positive results. In developing nations it is especially common 
to offer this screening test only to women who seek out health, while there 
is no strategy for ensuring that the most vulnerable women, namely poor 
women, will have the test and, if necessary, receive treatment 3.
Population screening requires a structured program of regular testing 
of an asymptomatic population displaying greater risk factors in order 
to identify precursor or cancerous lesions in their initial stages. To be 
effective, such a program must cover at least 70% of the target population 
and, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), an expensive, 
logistically complex program is only justified if : the type of cancer is 
epidemiologically significant, its asymptomatic phase is long enough to allow 
for detection, a significant percentage of precursor lesions develop into the 
 1. Created in Rio de Janeiro in 1937, when the city was federal capital, the Instituto Nacional de 
Câncer (INCA) is Brazil’s leading hospital in cancer treatment and in public policy on cancer 
control. The country’s 1988 Constitution assigned the institute responsibility for devising a 
national cancer control policy, ratified under the Organic Health Law (Lei Orgânica da Saúde, 
no. 8080), of 1990. In October 20th of 2011, the institute was rechristened the José Alencar 
Gomes da Silva National Cancer Institute in tribute to the former vice-president of Brazil, who 
passed away after battling the disease for nearly thirteen years. For further information on 
the history of the Institute, see: Teixeira, Luiz Antonio; Fonseca, Cristina Oliveira. De doença 
desconhecida a problema de saúde pública: o INCA e o controle de câncer no Brasil. Rio de 
Janeiro: Ministério da Saúde; 2007; Teixeira, Luiz Antonio; Porto, Marco; Noronha, Cláudio. O 
Câncer no Brasil: passado e presente. Rio de Janeiro: Outras Letras/FAPERJ; 2012.
 2. Instituto Nacional de Câncer. Estimativa 2012: incidência de câncer no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: 
INCA; 2011, p. 35.
 3. World Health Organization. Early Detection. Cancer control: knowledge into action. WHO 
guide for effective programmes, module 3. Geneva: WHO Press, 2007 (updated in Nov 2009. 
Available from: http://www.who.int/cancer/modules/en/)
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disease, treatment is available to improve prognosis, and the screening test 
is accepted by patients and available at a reasonable cost 4.
Our research offers a historical analysis of the construction of the 
technical, scientific, and management tools indispensable to this type 
of initiative, while it also discusses data about the more general political 
framework and associated social movement in Brazil. In this regard, our 
article contextualizes the topic within the broader study of Brazilian public 
policy.
Public policy definitions and analysis models can be wide-ranging. 
According to Atwood and collaborators 5 decision making and the 
implementation of public health policy is often led by crises, political 
considerations, and the mobilization of public opinion, triggering 
interdependence between medical and scientific knowledge and political and 
social context. Our investigation attempts to identify the actors, scenarios, 
and settings of the Viva Mulher program. In analyzing the program and its 
evolution from pilot project through subsequent campaigns, it is important 
to understand the conflicts and shifts between the Ministry of Health and 
INCA and the contribution of the social movement and the successive 
political and electoral contexts that, to differing degrees, played a part in 
building this pioneer public health policy for cancer control in Brazil.
2. Early initiatives 
The first population screening programs for cervical cancer began in regions 
of the United States in the 1950s 6. In Europe, Norway created such a program 
in 1959, with Denmark following suit the next year. In the 1960s, a number 
of Nordic countries implemented similar programs and by 1966 cervical 
cancer screening was part of England’s National Health Service 7. At that 
time, the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) cited cervical cancer 
 4. WHO, n. 3, p. 6.
 5. Atwood, Katharine; Colditz, Graham; Kawachi, Ichiro. From public health science to prevention 
policy: planning science in its social and political contexts. American Journal of Public Health. 
1997; 87(10): 1603-1606.
 6. Hakama, Matti; Chamberlain, John; Day, Nicholas; Miller, Anthony; Prorok, Philip. Evaluation of 
screening programs for gynecological cancer. British Journal of Cancer. 1985; 52: 669-673.
 7. Löwy, Ilana. Preventive strikes: women, precancer, and prophylactic surgery. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press; 2010.
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as an important public health problem in Latin America; after ascertaining 
that only limited preventive actions were being undertaken, the organization 
proposed that specific programs be developed to control the disease, based 
on mass screening using the Pap smear test 8.
The 1960s saw some initiatives to apply the method in Brazil. Cervical 
cancer prevention efforts were then starting to move beyond doctor’s offices 
and specialized hospitals to find their place in the public healthcare network. 
Established in 1956 in the city of Rio de Janeiro (former capital of Brazil), 
the Social Pioneers Foundation (Fundação das Pioneiras Sociais) was a 
philanthropic organization very active in education and health, especially in 
the field of chronic degenerative diseases and particularly those associated 
with female cancers. In the area of cervical cancer, the organization made 
several pertinent contributions directed at problems that still stand as 
central, challenging issues in the control of this kind of cancer in Brazil, 
especially in relation to fostering engagement with lower-class women (who 
find it harder both to grasp medical information and to obtain access to 
healthcare services) and in guaranteeing the quality of cytological tests 9. 
As regards the first matter, the Social Pioneers Foundation extended 
its activities to ten Brazilian states, creating not only specialized hospitals 
and, in Rio de Janeiro, a research center, but mobile hospitals as well as 
part of its «Health on Wheels» program, which included floating hospital 
units in the Amazon. As far as ensuring the reliability of the Pap smear is 
concerned, the first official cytopathology school was established in 1968 
to provide suitable training for the technicians who had the strategic role 
of taking the first readings of test slides 10.
In 1965, under the leadership of the Universidade Estadual de Campinas’ 
Department of Gynecology and Obstetrics and in accordance with PAHO 
guidelines, a Cervical Cancer Control Program was set up in the city of 
Campinas, São Paulo. It was Brazil’s first experience with broad-reaching, 
continuous ongoing action. In ten years, not only did the program reach 
 8. Horwitz, Abraham. Prólogo. In: Organización Panamericana de la Salud. Oficina Sanitaria Pana-
mericana. Manual de normas y procedimientos para el control del cáncer del cuello uterino. 
Publicación Científica no. 248. Washington: PAHO; 1972.
 9. Temperini, Rosana. A contribuição original da Fundação das Pioneiras Sociais. Palestra apre-
sentada durante o Seminário «O Controle dos Cânceres do Colo do Útero e da Mama no 
Brasil – trajetória, avanços e desafios». INCA/Fiocruz. Manaus/AM, Brazil, Jun. 20-21, 2012.
 10. Temperini, n. 9.
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a high number of 19,195 cytological tests per year; but on its fourth year, 
there was a drop in the number of lesions detected 11.
Relying on the same methodology employed in Campinas, other 
philanthropic institutions in the state of São Paulo devised cervical cancer 
control programs in the late 1960s. The São Camilo Institute for the 
Prevention and Treatment of Gynecological Cancer (Instituto São Camilo de 
Prevenção e Tratamento de Câncer Ginecológico) was created in 1967, while 
in 1968 was inaugurated the Brazilian Institute for Studies and Research 
in Obstetrics and Gynecology (Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos e Pesquisas 
em Obstetrícia e Ginecologia, or IBEPOG) 12.
By 1972, Brazil had spent eight years under a political dictatorship that 
took a liberal approach to economics. Grounded on this liberalism and on 
privatism, the predominant healthcare model enforced a merely curative 
approach to chronic degenerative disease, and the counterpart to the costly 
and not highly efficient process of equipping hospitals technologically 
was disregarded and preventive initiatives unattended 13. That year Brazil 
received its first manuals of PAHO technical recommendations and the 
Ministry of Health drew up its National Cancer Control Plan (Plano 
Nacional de Controle de Câncer, or PNCC), which was launched country-
wide in September 1973. Among its goals was the expansion of cervical 
cancer preventive actions through the Pap smear and the organization of 
a national network to control the disease. 14 
In 1975, the state of São Paulo’s Center for Oncology Research Foundation 
(Fundação Centro de Pesquisa em Oncologia, or FCPO) introduced a 
statewide cervical cancer prevention program that encompassed state and 
municipal health posts, some private doctors’ offices, and mobile testing 
units (buses and train cars) 15.
By the mid-1980s, Brazil’s healthcare model for cervical cancer had 
only allowed for prevention and early detection measures in the form of 
isolated, sporadic, non-nationwide initiatives carried out by certain institu-
 11. Pinotti, José Aristodemo; Zeferino, Luiz Carlos. Programa de controle de câncer cérvico-uterino. 
Campinas: Editora da Unicamp, Série Saúde da Mulher; 1987.
 12. Teixeira; Porto; Noronha, n. 1, p. 103.
 13. Silva Jr., Aluísio Gomes da. Modelos Tecnoassistenciais em Saúde. Rio de Janeiro: HUCITEC; 
1998.
 14. Teixeira; Porto; Noronha, n. 1, p. 100-102.
 15. Capucci, Fatima. Filosofia Sampaio Góes: Instituto Brasileiro de Controle do Câncer - IBCC 35 
anos. São Paulo: Editora Activa Comunicação; 2003.
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tions —generally philanthropic ones— or by health departments, usually 
municipal. In 1985, it was estimated that the cytological test for cervical 
cancer had reached only 2% of Brazil’s female population 16.
In 1984, against a backdrop of political re-democratization and the 
re-emergence of the social movement, the Integral Program for Women’s 
Healthcare (Programa de Atenção Integral à Saúde da Mulher, or PAISM) 
was created, which included cervical and uterine cancer prevention and 
control. As of 1985-86, the National Council on Women’s Rights (Conselho 
Nacional de Direitos da Mulher, or CNDM) and the National Institute of 
Medical Assistance (Instituto Nacional de Assistência Médica da Previdência 
Social, or INAMPS) started working together in order to solidify PAISM 
at a national level. In 1986, the National Division of Chronic Degenerative 
Diseases’ National Cancer Campaign (Campanha Nacional de Combate ao 
Câncer) put together a working group entrusted with elaborating a new 
strategy for dealing with cancer in Brazil 17.
In 1987, on the eve of formalizing the principles of the Public Health 
Reform contained in the new Brazilian Constitution (issued in 1988) 18 
the Pro-Onco Oncology Program was created; its projects included the 
«Expansion of the Prevention and Control of Cervical and Uterine Cancer» 19. 
In 1988, Pro-Onco held a conference entitled «Consensus on the Periodicity 
and Age Range for Preventive Testing for Cervical and Uterine Cancer», 
attended by Brazil’s top experts in the control of these cancers, members of 
the PAISM and representatives of women’s movements. Its by-product was 
a series of technical recommendations that became part of the approach 
 16. Ministério da Saúde/Ministério da Previdência e Assistência Social. Projeto de Expansão da 
Prevenção e Controle do Câncer Cérvico-Uterino – Quinquênio 1988-1992. Rio de Janeiro; 
1988.
 17. Teixeira; Porto; Noronha, n. 1, p. 104-106.
 18. Brazil’s Public Health Reform Movement got underway in the late 1970s, culminating in 1986 
with the Eighth National Health Conference. Its general lines defended health as a right 
of all citizens and a duty of the State, with universal access to all goods and services that 
promote and restore health. Out of this movement came the main guidelines of the 1988 
Constitution’s chapter on health and also of the Unified Health System (Sistema Único de 
Saúde), created in 1990. Escorel, Sarah; Nascimento, Dilene Raimundo; Edler, Flávio Coelho. 
As origens da reforma sanitária e do SUS. In: Lima, Nísia Trindade; Gerschman, Silvia; Edler, 
Flavio Coelho; Manuel Suárez, Julio. Saúde e democracia: história e perspectivas do SUS. Rio 
de Janeiro: FIOCRUZ; 2005, p. 59-81.
 19. Ministério da Saúde/Ministério da Previdência e Assistência Social. Projeto de Expansão da 
Prevenção e Controle do Câncer Cérvico-Uterino – Quinquênio 1988-1992. Rio de Janeiro, 
1988.
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endorsed by the Ministry of Health —for example, a target age range of 
25 to 60 and a three-year screening interval after two negative results 20. 
By the end of the 1980s, Brazilian women were enjoying greater 
citizenship status and much had been achieved in the production of 
scientific and epidemiological knowledge. Combined with various local and 
national experiences, this stimulated the demand for cervical cancer to be 
addressed in an organized fashion and at a nationwide level. In addition, 
Brazilian health services had undergone a structural change. In 1988, the 
new Constitution had proclaimed health a «right for all and a duty of the 
State» 21 and in 1990, the Unified Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde, 
or SUS) was created under Law no. 8080, laying the instrumental basis for 
ongoing actualization of this newly attained right. This new environment 
promoted the changes observed in the control of cervical cancer during 
the course of the 1990s. 
3. Pilot project
The aforementioned context aside, Brazil had no prior experience 
implementing a national program for secondary prevention of any type of 
disease prior to the 1990s. Moreover, Brazil’s sharp regional differences in 
terms of socioeconomics, geography, climate, and epidemiology tend to 
discourage attempts to set up a nationwide program with any singularly 
defined, rigid features. 
With these obstacles in mind, and with the goal of collecting data on the 
Brazilian healthcare networks in order to help develop a broader strategy, 
INCA announced the foundations of the Viva Mulher pilot program on 
the 27th November 1996, during the National Day Against Cancer (Dia 
Nacional de Combate ao Câncer). In 1997, with the aid of Canada’s Cancer 
Care International / Ontario Foundation —which had a large experience in 
planning organized screening programs, INCA began setting up this project 
 20. Abreu, Evaldo. Pro-Onco 10 anos. Revista brasileira de cancerologia. 1997; 43 (4): 237-238.
 21. Article 196: «Health is a right of all and a duty of the State and shall be guaranteed by means 
of social and economic policies aimed at reducing the risk of illness and other hazards and 
at the universal and equal access to actions and services for its promotion, protection, and 
recovery». Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Text enacted on October 05, 
1988, Section II — On health, page 33. Available from: http://www.senado.gov.br/legislacao/
const/con1988/CON1988_05.10.1988/CON1988.pdf (accessed May 31, 2012). 
Marco Antonio Porto and Paula Arantes Botelho Briglia Habib 
Dynamis 2014; 34 (1): 101-123
108
in municipalities of Brazil. Hubs were created in Curitiba, capital of Paraná, 
in January; in March, they reached Brasilia and smaller cities in the Federal 
District (Tabatinga, Ceilândia, and Samambaia); Recife, Pernambuco; and 
districts in Rio de Janeiro’s West Side (Campo Grande, Bangu, and Santa 
Cruz); in April, Belém, Pará; and in January 1998, the state of Sergipe —thus 
spreading services over five of the country’s macro-regions.
Viva Mulher sought to lower the incidence of the disease and its mortality 
rate by expanding access to cytopathology testing, first and foremost for 
women at greater risk, and also by guaranteeing adequate treatment of the 
disease and its precursor lesions in 100% of cases. The program’s target 
population was women aged 35 to 49; and a total of 124,440 women received 
care, of which 3.7% presented abnormal results and 5.7% were tested for 
the first time ever (ranging from 1.4% in Sergipe to 9.7% in Belém) 22.
The Ministry of Health provided direct funding for pilot project phases 
through both INCA and the Ary Frauzino Foundation (FAF) 23, which 
facilitated management and expedited actual implementation of initiatives. 
In technical terms, it was vital that the project spawn intermediary products 
with a view to the future structuring of a country-wide program. Generally 
speaking, Viva Mulher’s main contributions were the establishment of a 
model of decentralized action, the standardization of all stages of procedures 
(including adoption of the nomenclature that since 1993 had been endorsed 
by the Ministry of Health and by the Brazilian Society of Cytopathology), 
geographic expansion, and the definition of the recommended periodicity 
for Pap smears 24.
By conducting qualitative surveys among health professionals and 
the female populations in question, the pilot project sought to devise 
communication strategies that would overcome cultural and regional 
resistance. It enjoyed the support of the Universidade Federal do Rio de 
Janeiro (UFRJ) in preparing communication materials tailored to these 
groups. One of its greatest successes was probably the incorporation of the 
 22. Ministério da Saúde. Viva Mulher – Relatório Novembro de 2000 – metas cumpridas e novas 
perspectivas. Rio de Janeiro: INCA; 2000.
 23. The Ary Frauzino Foundation for Cancer Research and Control (Fundação Ary Frauzino para 
Pesquisa e Controle do Câncer) was created in 1991 by Marcos Moraes, then director of INCA, 
and three other physicians: Magda Côrtes Rodrigues Rezende, Jaime Brandão de Marsillac, 
and Ulpio Paulo de Miranda. FAF’s main purpose is to provide INCA with administrative 
support. Its name was changed in 2010 to the Cancer Foundation (Fundação do Câncer).
 24. Abreu, n. 20.
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technique known as «See and Treat» («Ver e Tratar»), under which women 
with precursor lesions of cancer were treated with high-frequency surgery 25.
At the same time, the pilot project also revealed some critical obstacles 
that would have to be addressed if a national program were to be launched. 
It was noted, for example, that guaranteeing the quality of test results 
would depend on the monitoring of external laboratories; software would 
have to be more user-friendly and, primarily, compatible with SUS systems; 
funding mechanisms would have to be found for ambulatory procedures; 
and managers would have to be recruited for a task of this magnitude 26.
However, in August 1998, before the pilot project was concluded and 
its results analyzed, the Ministry of Health took over responsibility for the 
control of cervical cancer in Brazil, through a broad national campaign that 
became known as the «intensification phase» —a move that constituted a 
kind of surreptitious intrusion. Perhaps the euphemism «intensification 
phase» was meant to suggest that this action had been planned all along 
and that a new phase had already been in the making, aimed at geographic 
expansion of the Viva Mulher pilot project. If such were the case, the 
initiative should not have come at a moment when most of the pilot activities 
had been underway for a little more than one year and, in the case of the 
state of Sergipe (the last to implement the Viva Mulher program), for only 
seven months.
The Ministry of Health presented the proposal for the national campaign 
to the Intersectoral Commission on Women’s Health (Comissão Intersetorial 
de Saúde da Mulher, or CISMU), an advisory board to the National Health 
Council (Conselho Nacional de Saúde, or CNS). Arguments against the 
idea were raised during subsequent discussions. There was concern that 
ground might be lost in the effort to enforce a paradigm of integral health 
care for women, since the Ministry would go back to working towards 
the solution of one specific problem, as well as a fear that the SUS would 
be unable to handle the expected large influx of women, who would then 
find themselves without treatment 27. Among the matters discussed at 
its August 1998 meeting, the CNS expressed its apprehension about the 
 25. Ministério de Saúde, n. 22, p. 9.
 26. Abreu, n. 20.
 27. Lago, Tania Di Giacomo de. Políticas Nacionais de Rastreamento do Câncer de colo uterino 
no Brasil – Análise do período 1998 a 2002. Campinas: Universidade Estadual de Campinas; 
2004.
Marco Antonio Porto and Paula Arantes Botelho Briglia Habib 
Dynamis 2014; 34 (1): 101-123
110
infrastructure that the Ministry of Health would be relying on to conduct 
the national campaign 28.
At that time, the Seventeenth International Cancer Congress was taking 
place in Brazil, under the sponsorship of the Union Internationale Contre 
le Cancer (UICC), the main worldwide NGO devoted to the fight against 
cancer (founded in 1933), at present with 400 member organizations from 
120 countries. It was not only the leadership of INCA —the institute that 
coordinated the pilot project— but also the majority of the experts attending 
the congress who felt the Brazilian government had precipitated itself and 
who condemned the ministerial decision. On August 29, 1998, the newspaper 
Folha de São Paulo 29 published the opinions from Brazilian specialists in 
health system and members of international agencies for cancer control 
who were against the implementation of the national campaign. Anthony 
Miller, PAHO consultant and member of the International Agency for 
Cancer Research (IARC), stated:
«This should have been done in stages, and with smaller groups, as a 
continuation of Viva Mulher. We’re very concerned about this mass campaign, 
undertaken without our recommendation. Sometimes governments do things 
like this» 30.
 28. In her expert statement about the National Program to Fight Cervical Cancer (Programa Nacional 
de Combate ao Câncer do Colo Uterino), board member Zenite Freitas said that the program’s 
goal was to improve Brazilian women’s quality of life by reducing morbidity and mortality 
rates from cervical and uterine cancer through early detection with the Pap smear followed 
by suitable treatment of the cancer and of precursor lesions. However, she also admitted to 
some shortcomings: 1. the lack of a follow-up structure; 2. the program’s non-continuous 
nature; 3. a paucity of human resources; 4. the absence of public-private relations; 5. the 
absence of any explicit quality control; 6. the non-involvement of states and municipalities 
(a SUS principle); 7. the excluding, selective nature of the program’s focus on a specific age 
range; 8. ethical concerns, given the risk of detecting the disease without affording the 
prospect of treatment and follow-up.  Ministério da Saúde. Atas do Conselho Nacional de 
Saúde [article in Internet]. 1998 [accessed Nov 2011]: lines 442-451. Available from: http://
conselho.saude.gov.br/atas/atas_00.htm.
 29. Founded on February 19, 1921, the Folha de S. Paulo is one of the most influential newspapers 
in Brazil and the second largest in circulation, according to data from the Instituto Verifica-
dor de Circulação (IVC). It is published in the city of São Paulo by Grupo Folha. The Folha de 
São Paulo at first supported the 1964 military takeover and subsequent dictatorship, but in 
the mid-1970s the paper began defending a return to democracy and was the first in the 
Brazilian media to embrace the struggle for direct elections and cover the «Elections Now» 
movement.
 30. Escóssia, Fernanda da; Martins, Lucia. Consultores criticam campanha do cancer. Folha de São 
Paulo [article in Internet]. 29 Aug 1998, p. 3. [accessed Nov 2011]. Available from: http://
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Denny Depetrillo —Head of Surgical Oncology at Princess Margaret 
Hospital, Coordinator of the Surgical Oncology Network for Cancer 
Care Ontario and Vice President of Professional Affairs for Cancer Care 
International— went further:
«Things were rushed, and I am concerned about the shortage of properly 
trained personnel to perform the tests. I know that the government has the 
money. But I think there’ll be trouble with infrastructure» 31.
Hildoberto Carneiro de Oliveira, professor from the Universidade do 
Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) and former chairman of the Brazilian 
Federation of Societies of Gynecology and Obstetrics (Febrasgo), was of 
the same opinion: «They rushed to launch the campaign —possibly for 
political reasons» 32.
In addition to these opinions from specialists, the newspaper wrote 
that sources said «the ministry also had allegedly received a PAHO report 
criticizing the launching of the campaign». «The ministry denied this 
information», Folha stated further on in the same article 33.
Contested by the technical group responsible for coordination of Viva 
Mulher and by the leadership of INCA itself —all in frank disagreement 
with him— and also finding himself facing opposition from both Brazilian 
and foreign experts, the Health Minister spoke to Folha:
«Health Minister José Serra says he considers the criticisms of experts 
“the poppycock of people on the outside”. According to him, the prevention 
campaign will only help and will take the problem [of cervical cancer] to 
women: “This can in no way hurt”. The ministry said it would “be entirely able 
to” finalize all stages of the prevention program. “This is a program with a 
beginning, a middle — and it only has no end because we intend to continue 
it”, says Paulo Kalume, with the National Program to Fight Cervical Cancer 
(Programa Nacional de Combate ao Câncer do Colo Uterino). According to 
acervo.folha.com.br/resultados?q=viva+mulher&site=fsp&periodo=acervo&x=14&y=15. The 
newspaper Folha de São Paulo does not offer a direct link to the news, but to the electronic 
search system. 
 31. Escóssia; Martins, n. 30.
 32. Escóssia; Martins, n. 30.
 33. Escóssia; Martins, n. 30.
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him, “the ministry has mapped out a number of regions in the country for 
organizing the campaign» 34.
These blatant disagreements over the campaign execution were cut 
short by a show of strength on the part of the Health Minister, who, a 
few days later, dismissed the director of INCA, leading to the resignation 
of his appointed staff. In counterpart —and the misgivings cited earlier 
notwithstanding— the ministry received the support of the National Health 
Council 35.
4. First campaign or first intensification phase 
The Health Ministry’s intervention in the Viva Mulher pilot project does 
not appear to have stemmed from any criticism about the work INCA had 
done on the project up until then or from any technical discrepancies. As 
suggested earlier, the reasons behind it seem instead related to matters 
of a more general political nature and to a logic lying outside the field of 
cancer control.
In September 1995, the United Nations had held the Fourth World 
Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development, and Peace, in 
Beijing, China. Present at the event were 189 governments and over 5,000 
representatives of 2,100 NGOs from around the world. For two years, the 
women’s movement in Brazil had worked with over 800 women’s groups 
in preparation for the event, and the country proved an active participant. 
During the preparation phase, the Brazilian government drafted and submitted 
a paper to the UN entitled «General Report about the Woman in Brazilian 
Society» («Relatório Geral Sobre a Mulher na Sociedade Brasileira»); it 
 34. É bobagem’, diz ministro Serra. Folha de São Paulo. [Article in Internet]. 29 Aug 1998, p. 3 
[Accessed Nov. 2011]. Available from: http://acervo.folha.com.br/resultados?q=viva+mul-
her&site=fsp&periodo=acervo&x=14&y=15.
 35. CNS Resolution no. 285: «The Council shall support the development of the National Program 
to Fight Cervical Cancer» and requests that the «Ministry of Health continue to submit to the 
CNS, through the CISMU, information about the development of the Program». Informes e 
Notícias, Conselho Nacional de Saúde apóia mobilização nacional para prevenção do câncer 
de colo de útero. [Article in Internet] Jul./Aug. 1998 [Accessed Jun.2012]. Available from: 
http://www.datasus.gov.br/conselho/informes/240898/cancerutero.html.
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also sent a 25 member delegation to the event itself, led by the First Lady, 
Ruth Cardoso 36.
The main topics addressed in Beijing were: advances in human rights 
for women; women and poverty; women and decision-making; female 
children; and violence against women. There were two health priorities: the 
prevention and promptly treatment of gynecological cancers, and family 
planning. The head of the Brazilian delegation committed the nation to 
working to change the reality of cervical cancer. The personal and intense 
involvement of the wife of the President of Brazil strengthened the links 
between the federal government and the women’s movement, fueling an 
expectation for greater female participation in public policy making in 
Brazil, including the health area 37.
In the worlds of Nelson Cardoso de Almeida, an important manager 
during Viva Mulher program:
«The Viva Mulher program was a response to demands by former First 
Lady Ruth Cardoso, with former INCA director Marcos Moraes. She wanted 
a strong cervical cancer control program because she had taken on this 
commitment at the International Women’s Conference in China. She herself 
was under pressure from the organized women’s movement, and passed this 
pressure along upon her return to Brazil. The project was born, but not, it 
doesn’t seem to me, at the pace the government had hoped for. In a nation 
this size, it’s very hard to lay a solid foundation across the whole country. I 
think that at some point, [there came] the realization that the natural course 
of the Viva Mulher program, the way it was being conducted, would take 
longer than expected. So it was decided to wage a major national initiative to 
mobilize women and municipal and state governments to join in the process» 38.
 36. Conselho Nacional de Direitos da Mulher. IV Conferência Mundial Sobre a Mulher: Ação para 
Igualdade, Desenvolvimento e Paz (Beijing, 1995). Rio de Janeiro: Fiocruz; 1996; Lago, n. 27, 
p. 29.
 37. Conselho Nacional de Direitos da Mulher, n. 36, p. 29.
 38. The authors participated in interviews or had access to interviews with managers involved in 
establishing Viva Mulher, to wit: Luiz Claudio Thuler (interviewed on 9 Oct  2010); Nelson 
Cardoso de Almeida (interviewed on 5 May 2011); Lucília Zardo (interviewed on 20 May 
2011); and Tereza Feitosa (interviewed on 26 Oct 2011). Acervo de Depoimentos do projeto 
«História do Câncer – atores, cenários e políticas públicas»: Available from: www.historiado-
cancer.coc.fiocruz.br. Almeida, Nelson Cardoso. Acervo de Depoimentos do projeto «História 
do Câncer – atores, cenários e políticas públicas». Rio de Janeiro: Fiocruz/Casa de Oswaldo 
Cruz/DEPES. Interview given on 5 May 2011 to researchers Letícia Pumar and Paula Habib.
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In 1998 —the year Brazil’s president was on the campaign trail, taking 
advantage of the new right to re-election within the executive branch that 
had been granted under a Constitutional amendment— the Ministry of 
Health apparently decided to use the opportunity to respond loud and 
clear to the pledge made in Beijing. This decision —besides eliciting the 
reaction by foreign experts mentioned earlier— also generated controversy 
among Brazilian health professionals and academics, especially in the public 
health field. All warned about the weak efficacy of temporary actions and 
the need to create an ongoing, standardized program to control cervical 
cancer in Brazil 39.
Despite these many criticisms and question marks, from August 18 to 
September 30, 1998, the intensification phase of Viva Mulher got underway, 
now under the coordination of the Ministry of Health’s Department of 
Health Policy, with technical assistance provided by a national committee 
comprising representatives of diverse areas within the Ministry itself as 
well as from the ministries of the Navy, Army, and Air Force, along with 
representatives from fifteen public or private institutions, such as the Catholic 
Church’s Pastoral da Criança (Children’s Ministry), the National Councils 
of Municipal and State Health Departments, and some scientific societies. 
It should be taken into account that the SUS was only ten years old at the 
time and that this was the country’s first major nationwide experience in 
mobilizing public institutions and civil society 40.
According to a Health Ministry’s report, 97.9% of Brazilian municipalities 
(i.e., 5,389 of them) took part in the intensification phase and 3,177,740 
Pap smears were done, of which 72.1% represented women from the target 
population. In addition to repeating the pilot project’s successful strategies, 
and in view of its national character, this campaign (or intensification 
phase) sought to enact other initiatives as well, yielding positive results for 
the overall process 41. Among them were the implementation of a specific 
electronic system for monitoring activities (Siscolo) and the consolidation of 
the decentralization process initiated under the pilot project, which included 
expansion of laboratory coverage for slide reading, the establishment of 244 
centers around the country where high-frequency surgery was available, 
and the formation of a regional tertiary healthcare network. Considering 
 39. Ministério da Saúde, n. 22, p. 16.
 40. Ministério da Saúde, n. 22, p. 38.
 41. Ministério da Saúde, n. 22, p. 45-47.
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the main factors behind disease vulnerability, the intensification phase met 
important goals: 38.6% of examined women had never had a Pap smear and 
72.1% of the tests (according to Siscolo records only) involved women in 
the target age group 42.
The slogan «Remind someone you care about» («Lembre alguém que você 
queira bem») became the main message of a large-scale publicity campaign, 
encompassing television and radio ads, billboards, posters, and flyers as well 
as publicity stunts in major cities, like giant pink ribbons 43 wrapped around 
monuments and public buildings. The campaign let Brazilian women know 
that they had a major commitment in August and September of that year: 
to have a cervical cancer prevention test.
A number of operational glitches kept the campaign from running 
smoothly and impeded the achievement of the planned objectives. The 
establishment of the electronic Siscolo system was disorganized, leading 
to inconsistencies in the inclusion of data by laboratories. Two weeks after 
the activities commenced, the proposal to focus on the 35-49 age range had 
to be tabled under heavy and spontaneous pressure from women seeking 
Pap smears at health posts:
«Two weeks into the campaign, the guideline had to be thrown out 
and the test opened up to everyone, because women were out on the streets 
demonstrating. During the second campaign [to be addressed next in this 
article], we expanded the age range to 25 to 59 and advised the states and 
municipalities that we visited not to deny women the test» 44.
Since the health system was not prepared for an initiative of this 
magnitude, many women who responded to the campaign could not get 
tested, one reason being a shortage of doctors. An attempt was made to 
solve this problem by extending the campaign for 15 more days 45.
The biggest problems, however, had to do with reading the slides and 
dealing with women whose results were positive. It was not unusual, for 
 42. Ministério da Saúde, n. 22, p. 48-50.
 43. This pink symbol had no relationship with the international campaign dedicated to breast 
cancer, known as «Pink Ribbon».
 44. Thuler, Luiz Cláudio. Acervo de Depoimentos do projeto «História do Câncer – atores, cenários 
e políticas públicas». Rio de Janeiro: Fiocruz/Casa de Oswaldo Cruz/DEPES; Interview given 
on 9 October 2010 to researchers Letícia Pumar and Marco Antonio Porto.
 45. Thuler, n. 44.
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instance, that results were lost in the mail; that addresses were incomplete 
or incorrect in at least 30% of the cases, which hampering the localization of 
the woman and their subsequent follow-up. In addition the quality control 
module for the tests was not ready in time for the campaign and, surprisingly, 
the number of tests completed corresponded to only one-third of those 
recorded in the Siscolo system, limiting any quantitative data analysis 46.
In the state of Acre, located in the North of Brazil, six months after 
the campaign had ended, a box was found with over one thousand slides 
that had never been read. The material was forwarded to INCA’s laboratory 
and the results returned to Acre’s Department of Health. Nearly one year 
had passed since testing, and it was extremely difficult to locate the women 
and give them their results:
«Women would go to a health centre and when they got there, there 
wouldn’t be any doctor to see them. She’d have a test done and wouldn’t 
get the results. Six months later, for example, like in the state of Acre, we 
recovered a box of slides from the first campaign, a box with a thousand and 
some slides. Not a single one had been read. The tests had been done but the 
slides had never been stained. They came here to SITEC and were stained 
here, examined here, and the results returned to the women. The trouble is 
that one year later, it gets really hard to find a woman to give her the results» 47.
In conclusion, the state of unpreparedness on the part of the health 
network, in combination with the operational complexity of a campaign that 
had to be completed in a month and a half, put at serious risk a contingent 
of 12,125 women with positive diagnoses for high-grade precursor lesions 
or for cancer, and a strategy had to be devised for handling these cases. 
The Ministry of Health swiftly responded by giving the coordination of 
the cervical cancer control program back to the INCA, together with the 
responsibility for locating and providing treatment to the thousands of 
affected women.
According to the majority of public health managers and social leaders 
interviewed, the most successful facet of this phase was the far-reaching 
social communication plan, devoted to publicizing the campaign and to 
mobilizing women to take the test. The strategy was to get women to 
 46. Instituto Nacional de Câncer. Programa Nacional de Controle de Câncer do Colo do Útero – 
Evolução Histórica. Rio de Janeiro: INCA; 2000, p. 21-26.
 47. Thuler, n. 44.
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tie a pink ribbon around their wrists, a gesture associated with trying to 
remember something like an important fact or date.
5. Consolidation phase
In November 1998, under new direction, the INCA was charged by the 
Ministry of Health with solving the issue of what to do about women whose 
results had been positive during the national campaign. But the institute 
was also unprepared to handle this sudden challenge, which called for 
considerable effort on the part of the staff at the INCA’s prevention and 
control sector, known as CONPREV (Coordenação de Prevenção e Vigilância). 
The team worked under great pressure, with the Health Ministry demanding 
results as it in turn was admonished about its responsibility to the women 
mobilized by the campaign. At the end, and after almost one year of intense 
investigations and close communications with state and municipal health 
departments the result was perhaps inadequate given the matter’s serious 
nature, but it was equally surprising, considering the conditions under 
which the work was done: 83% of women presenting positive results were 
located and treated 48.
Starting in April 1999, the INCA tried to ensure the continuity of its 
first organizational accomplishments and to make further progress with 
the structure of Viva Mulher, incorporating the experience gained in the 
national campaign. This included strengthening the program’s geopolitical 
base by signing agreements with state-level departments, adjusting protocols 
for follow-up of women presenting positive results, expanding human 
resource training at all levels of the service network, increasing the number 
of cytopathology laboratories and enforcing proper use of Siscolo, refining 
and expanding high-frequency surgery centers, and, in terms of more general 
national management, using the rate of cytopathology testing for cervical 
cancer among the female population as a measure of primary health care 
at the level of Brazilian municipalities 49.
 48. Ministério da Saúde. Viva Mulher - Câncer do colo do útero: informações técnico-gerenciais e 
ações desenvolvidas. Rio de Janeiro: INCA; 2002.
 49. Ministério da Saúde. 2.ª fase de Intensificação do Programa Nacional de Controle do Câncer 
do Colo do Útero. Brasília: Centro de Documentação; 2001.
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A vital element for continuation of the program was the preservation 
of financing from the Fund for Strategic Actions and for Compensation 
(Fundo de Ações Estratégicas e de Compensação, or FAEC), which had 
been paying for exams; for each state and municipality, this funding was 
estimated to cover the equivalent to annual screening of 30% of resident 
women between the ages of 25 and 60 50.
6. Second campaign or second intensification phase 
After re-assuming management of cervical cancer control actions, and also 
after resolving the problems caused by the 1998 national campaign, the 
INCA outlined a strategy centered around two general concerns: preserving 
the structure mounted during the first intensification phase and investing 
efforts in the consolidation of a network of communications, knowledge, 
and services robust enough to underpin regular initiatives by the Viva 
Mulher program. This endeavor continued until 2001, when the Ministry 
of Health called for a new campaign, this time to be managed by the INCA 
in conjunction with an Executive Committee representing various of the 
ministry’s technical sectors 51, an idea that proved operationally clumsy 
given the lack of any real working relationship between the institute and 
ministerial sectors.
The second intensification phase not only could count on human 
resources and a material structure that had been gradually assembled since 
the pilot project got underway in January 1997; it also began its preparations 
much earlier than the first phase, allowing the INCA staff to work with 
health departments in more populous states and municipalities to improve 
their level of organization. The proposal for the new national campaign was 
first submitted to the Tripartite Inter-managerial Commission (Comissão 
Intergestores Tripartite) on May 17 and June 20 and then to state coordinators 
of the Viva Mulher program and representatives of the Council of Municipal 
Health Departments (Conselho dos Secretários Municipais de Saúde) on July 
11 and 12 in Brasilia and on July 17 and 18 in Rio de Janeiro 52.
 50. Ministério da Saúde, n. 48.
 51. Portaria no. 1102/Gabinete do Ministro, July 30, 2001.
 52. Instituto Nacional de Câncer. 2.ª Fase de Intensificação das Ações de Controle do Câncer do 
Colo do Útero. Rio de Janeiro: INCA; 2001.
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Once again, the proposed target population was women in the 35-49 
age bracket who had never had a Pap smear test or who had not had one 
in the past three years; the goal was to accelerate coverage of the Brazilian 
female population and to reach women in the highest risk group age-wise. 
There was an unprecedented move to coordinate work with the National 
Indian Foundation (FUNAI), who took on the task of conducting tests 
among indigenous women and providing health departments with results 53.
To attain the goal of testing 2.5 million women, and to bypass some 
of the hurdles encountered in the first campaign, the healthcare network 
was sent enough material to make the Pap smear test to respond to a 30% 
increase in the demand. This decision proved very successful as over 3.8 
million women ended up being tested. Responding not only to women’s 
natural interest in getting tested even if outside the target age limits, the 
campaign coordinators expanded the age range to 25-59 and told states and 
municipalities they should not deny a Pap smear to anyone requesting one 54.
The Health Ministry’s Social Communication Office (Assessoria de 
Comunicação Social) drew up flyers and posters and sent this material to 
health departments in advance in order to help mobilize women. Criticisms 
were lodged about the material, especially the particular female model chosen 
to illustrate it, as she looked nothing like the population targeted by the 
campaign. Radio and TV ads also ran on a number of popular programs, 
featuring the new Health Minister (the former Minister had stepped down 
to run for president) 55.
To manage the campaign, the INCA put in place a logistics system 
that accompanied activities, centralized in a situation room that was in 
permanent contact with health department’s heads through telephone and 
videoconferencing via satellite. Still, there were sporadic problems, such 
as in the city of São Gonçalo, Rio de Janeiro, where health posts failed to 
open on time, and in the city of Rio de Janeiro itself, which was grappling 
with an epidemic of dengue fever and moved the campaign to start on May 
7 until June 6 of 2002:
«At the time of the second campaign, we set up a “situation room” at 
INCA, with people at CONPREV with their ears to the telephone. People had 
 53. Ministério da Saúde, n. 48, p. 45-48.
 54. Ministério da Saúde, n. 49, p. 12.
 55. Ministério da Saúde, n. 48, p. 58-59.
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their ears glued to the phone all day, using those headset things. The person 
would spend all day just taking calls from municipalities and states. We did 
videoconferencing via [satellite], for municipalities where there was a signal. 
[. . .] We tried to get as close as possible to those who were actually going to 
carry out the work» 56.
There were no new campaigns after that. Starting in 2005, the Viva 
Mulher program began emphasizing the formation of the Oncological Care 
Network (Rede de Atenção Oncológica) 57 by providing technical assistance 
to health departments, upgrading Siscolo technologically (DATASUS), and 
defining indicators for monitoring its initiatives 58.
7. Conclusion
Like other chronic diseases, cancer requires complex and continuous health 
action involving different levels of the health system. Although cervical cancer 
has long been a public health problem in Brazil, a number of factors delayed 
the adoption of a proper program for addressing it. In more general terms, 
the main hindrance was the health model in place prior to the enactment of 
the 1988 Constitution and the 1990 creation of the Unified Health System 
 56. Thuler, n. 44.
 57. Administrative Ruling (Portaria) GM no. 2439, of December 18, 2005, established the National 
Oncological Care Policy (Política Nacional de Atenção Oncológica), which recognized cancer 
as a public health problem and determined that actions to control the disease were un-
dertaken within the sphere of an Oncological Care Network, with the participation of the 
federal government and state and municipal health departments. One important guideline 
indicated that all municipal and state health plans had to include a cervical cancer control 
plan (Ministério da Saúde. Portaria n.º 2.439/GM. Institui a Política Nacional de Atenção On-
cológica: promoção, prevenção, diagnóstico, tratamento, reabilitação e cuidados paliativos, 
a ser implantada em todas as unidades federadas, respeitadas as competências das três 
esferas de gestão. Diário Oficial da República Federativa do Brasil. Brasilia, DF, no. 76, seção 
1, pp. 80-81, Dec., 2005). Later, the «Health Pact» (Ministério da Saúde. Portaria n.º 399/GM. 
Divulga o Pacto pela Saúde 2006 - Consolidação do SUS e aprova as Diretrizes Operacionais 
do Referido Pacto. Diário Oficial da República Federativa do Brasil. Poder Executivo, Seção 1, 
p. 43. Brasilia, DF, Feb., 2006); the National Basic Care Policy (Ministério da Saúde. Secretaria 
de Atenção à Saúde. Departamento de Atenção Básica. Política Nacional de Atenção Básica. 
Brasilia: Ministério da Saúde, 2006); and the «More Health: Everyone’s Right - 2008-2011» 
program (Ministério da Saúde. Programa Mais-Saúde - Direito de Todos: 2008-2011. [Série C. 
Projetos, Programas e Relatórios], 2nd ed. Brasilia, DF, 2008) also placed priority on measures 
to control this type of cancer. 
 58. Ministério da Saúde, n. 49, p. 65-70.
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(SUS), which granted universal access of the population to a network of 
health services with different levels of complexity. In this scenario, only a 
small portion of the population —government workers and those employed 
in the formal market— had access to health services at different levels of 
complexity. The Ministry of Health, still heedless of the epidemiological 
changes in course in Brazil, took charge of controlling the so-called «major 
endemic diseases», which comprised an array of infectious illnesses that 
did not include any chronic degenerative disease, like cancer.
Furthermore, the country’s technical and assistance model directed 
funds and efforts almost exclusively toward the incorporation of heavy 
technology, especially in the hospital environment and in the practice 
of «super specialties» 59. In such a context, issues like health promotion, 
prevention measures, and early detection of cancer received little objective 
support. The absence of any commitment to basic public health action was 
also made manifest in the priorities chosen for addressing disease problems 
and in the lack of any conceptual link between health and development. 
Nine years after health care became a right under Brazil’s 1988 
Constitution, and seven years after the INCA’s foundation, the institute 
launched a pilot project aimed at future construction of a cervical cancer 
control program in Brazil. Despite the urgent need to address the second 
most common form of cancer among women in Brazil, the lack of basic 
structural conditions combined with inexperience in setting up nationwide 
programs led to the adoption of a progressive strategy, where knowledge and 
experience could be acquired while working alongside state and municipal 
health departments. In short, it would be necessary to devise and bring to 
maturity a coordinated multi-stage program that could have a significant 
impact on the incidence and mortality rates for this kind of cancer.
In focusing on a number of Brazil’s macro-regions, the Viva Mulher 
pilot project strove to integrate several social and cultural elements from 
the target population (including gender issues) with technical, scientific, 
and knowledge management. As one might expect, the pilot project moved 
forward slowly, ran into foreseen and unforeseen problems, and even had 
to cope with a certain incompatibility between the proposals and attitudes 
of Canadian consultants and those of the Brazilian personnel (although, 
 59. Silva Jr., n. 13.
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in concrete terms, the most damaging incompatibility was between an 
electronic system from the Canadian consultants and SUS systems).
It is hard to say how this process would have developed had it not been 
for the brusque intervention called the first «intensification phase». At its 
own pace, the Viva Mulher pilot project was in the process of identifying 
and implementing methods that would lay the technical foundations of a 
future program, when there emerged on the scene a political demand for 
a nationwide campaign —an opportunity whose potential contribution, in 
principle, only the Ministry of Health seemed to have considered. 
Curiously enough, a message from the head of INCA entitled «Four Years 
of the Viva Mulher Program» («Quatro Anos de Programa Viva Mulher») 
—part of an assessment published in 2002 60— ignored the institute’s own 
pilot project and painted the program as wholly planned, its successive 
phases all intentionally laid out, in a way the facts do not seem to support.
Despite the technical and political fallout occasioned by this intervention 
in a process until then led by the INCA, this article has pointed some positives 
outcomes. After all, in the context of drafting public policy, highlighting the 
nonexistence, insufficiency, or inefficaciousness of screening procedures 
can in itself be considered a contribution to the process.
When the INCA resumed the management of the program, it moved to 
strengthen its relations with state health departments in hopes of forming 
an integrated national network, grounded in a geopolitical management 
core that could sustain a cervical cancer control program and its various 
phases of execution.
The program’s guiding axis shifted progressively from emphasis on early 
detection to the concept of «lines of care», within the broader context of 
the Oncological Care Network, covering all levels of complexity: primary, 
secondary and tertiary healthcare service, health promotion, prevention, 
diagnosis, treatment, rehabilitation, and palliative care. Viva Mulher became 
a permanent program, currently targeting a population of women aged 
between 25 and 64. Its main focus is the provision of routine exams and 
the improvement of the Oncological Care Network by providing states with 
technical assistance, modernizing Siscolo in technological terms, monitoring 
indicators, and establishing agreements with health managers.
 60. Ministério da Saúde, n. 49.
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From a historical perspective, this initial analysis of Viva Mulher is 
meant to contribute to a debate on health action, especially the study of 
cervical cancer control initiatives in Brazil, as well as to the more recent 
understanding of cancer as a public health problem in this country. œ

